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Abstract
Using new linked employer-employee data from Germany, this article provides the first
evidence on the effect of employer provided occupational pensions on work
engagement. Famous efficiency wage theories predict that pensions enhance effort if a
risk of forfeiture of pension claims is present. Exploiting the German non-forfeiture
clause for employer-provided pensions, the results are consistent with the theoretical
prediction and show that pensions in combination with the risk of forfeiture exert a
positive effect on work engagement. Since occupational pension claims are selectively
distributed across establishments, I control for establishment heterogeneity, but point
estimates remain of the same size. Conditional quantile regression estimates indicate
that especially the lower end of the engagement distribution is affected, which
suggests that pensions combined with the risk of forfeiture are effective to reduce
incentives for shirking.
JEL classification: J14; J26; J32
Keywords: Occupational pensions; Non-forfeiture clause; Efficiency wages;
Delayed compensation; Work engagement
1 Introduction
ManyGermans rely solely on the public pay-as-you-go pension scheme in which pensions
are financed by contemporary contributions to the social security system. Demographic
change, which has led to a shrinking work force (Fuchs and Söhnlein 2013) and an increas-
ing percentage of the older population, places increasing demands on such pay-as-you-go
pension schemes. Most of the suggested policy measures to reform the pension sys-
tem try to increase the share of private financial savings. Since occupational pensions
are an instrument for private pension savings, they have received increasing public and
political interest. In a recent comparison concerning the flexibility of pension systems,
Mercers (2013) ranked Germany in the mid-field of 20 countries. Countries in the top
group of the ranking, such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK, all
have particularly emphasized occupational pension schemes characterized by high par-
ticipation rates. In Germany, the share of employees with occupational pension claims
has been rising in the last decade, and in 2011, about 60% of the employees had claims for
an occupational pension (Figure 1).
These facts lead to the major puzzle underlying this article: Why do employers provide
occupational pensions at all? Theoretically, providing an occupational pension comes at
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Figure 1 Occupational pension claims in Germany. Note: Population-weighted share of employees (liable to
social security contributions) with pension claims. Source: Numbers retrieved from a published report of TNS
Infratest Sozialforschung (2012).
a cost to the employer. The employer commits himself to pay monthly contributions and
additionally, he also has to deal with the administrative costs of managing the contribu-
tions to the pension plan. To cover these costs, a rational employer expects something in
return (Gustman et al. 1994; Schnabel and Wagner 2001).
Previous literature mostly analyzes whether occupational pensions are an effective tool
to reduce turnover rates. While some studies cannot prove a mobility reducing effect
(Andrietti 2001; Taylor 2000), most of the literature finds a negative relationship between
pensions and turnover rates (Even and Macpherson 1996; Gustman and Steinmeier 1993;
Henley et al. 1994; Hernaes et al. 2011; McCormick and Hughes 1984; Mealli and Pudney
1996). For Germany, Rabe (2007) suggests that the reduced turnover rates result from
restricted portability of pensions, i.e., the risk of forfeiture of pension claims.
I exploit the non-forfeiture clause for employer provided pensions in Germany
(BetrAVG 2009), which regulates the retention of pension claims in the case of job
loss. Employees with more than five years of contributions retain their pension claims.
However, employees receiving contributions for less than five years face the risk of for-
feiture. In case of a credible threat of losing the pension benefits, standard efficiency
wage theories suggest that wage premiums, such as pensions, can serve as an instru-
ment to reduce incentives for shirking, i.e., they can increase average work effort. For this
mechanism to operate, it requires that employers are able to lay-off workers if shirking
is detected. Although Germany has strict Employment Protection Legislation by inter-
national standards, recent evidence has proven that the German labor market is in fact
very un-protective, and therefore shirking theories may apply. Bauer et al. (2007) present
precise evidence that the German employment protection legislation does not affect
employment decisions. Moreover, studies by Bellmann et al. (2011; 2013) show that, such
as in the United States, German firms use hiring and firing to adjust employment.
In the theoretical considerations, I review standard efficiency wage theories, referring
to the agency model by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), as well as Lazear’s model of delayed
compensations. The theories predict that occupational pensions reduce incentives for
shirking if a risk of forfeiture is present. In line with theory, I construct an empirical
model in which work effort is the dependent variable in a regression on pensions and an
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interaction capturing the risk of forfeiture. In this specification, theory predicts a positive
impact of the interaction term but is uncertain about the direct effect of pensions on work
engagement.
The suggested relationship between pensions and effort is prevalent in standard non-
classical wage setting theories (Akerlof 1982; Lazear 1979; Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984),
but to the best of my knowledge, this is the first application testing this clear theoretical
relation. In the empirical analysis, I use the Utrecht Work Engagement Scale to measure
employee engagement as a proxy for effort. New German Linked Employer-Employee
data allow me to control for establishment heterogeneity using employer specific observ-
able variables or an employer specific fixed effect. The employer specific heterogeneity
controls for selectivity in the provision of pensions across workplaces. Several robustness
checks, which control for individual personality as well as the perceived work envi-
ronment, demonstrate that omitted variables, both in the individual and the workplace
dimension, are unlikely to affect the estimates. Finally, I use conditional quantile regres-
sions to evaluate the effect of pensions on the entire conditional engagement distribution,
which provides a direct test on whether the shirking hypothesis applies—that is, whether
it increases effort in the lower tail of the distribution or at all points of the distribution.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I summarize the institutional background
of employer-provided pensions in Germany including the non-forfeiture clause and the
average quantitative value of contributions. Section 3 summarizes the theoretical pre-
dictions from efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984) and the theory of delayed
compensations (Lazear 1979). Descriptive regressions in Section 5 show to what extent
pension claims are selectively distributed across employers, which emphasizes the impor-
tance of incorporating this dimension in the regression analysis. In Section 6, I present
the core results of this article. I provide several robustness checks to the baseline regres-
sions in Section 7. Section 8 presents quantile regressions on the entire engagement
distribution, and Section 9 concludes.
2 Institutional background
The 3-pillar categorization of The World Bank (1994) classifies pensions as obligatory
public pensions, obligatory privately managed pensions, and voluntary privately managed
pensions. In Germany, occupational pensions can be assigned to the third pillar of vol-
untary privately managed savings. Unlike other European countries, Germany does not
demand obligatory privately managed savings.
2.1 The non-forfeiture clause
The major policy regulation which I exploit in this article is the non-forfeiture clause
(BetrAVG 2009). It regulates whether employees retain their pension claims in the case
of job termination. The current regulation requires at least five years of contributions. If
an employment relationship is terminated after five years of employer provided contribu-
tions, pension claims are vested. However, if employment is terminated within the first
five years of contributions, pension claims forfeit.
This contemporary regulation came into force on 1 January 2009 and replaced the old
ten year non-forfeiture clause. The regulation has been reformed a few times in the past
and originates from a case in law in the early 1970s when the German Federal Labour
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Court (“Bundesarbeitsgericht”) decided that employees have the right to retain their
pension claims after 20 years of contributions (Bundesarbeitsgericht 1972).
I exploit the contemporary five-years threshold because it ensures a credible risk of
forfeiture within the first five years.1 After five years, the non-forfeiture clause expires and
employees retain their pension claims. As I will show in section 3, the five-years threshold
may substantially change the employees’ incentives for shirking.
2.2 Contributions to occupational pension plans
TNS Infratest Sozialforschung (2012) provides a comprehensive longitudinal overview on
occupational pensions in Germany, presenting results from surveys in which employers
and a large variety of pension plan providers are interviewed on participation rates and
financing issues. Representative for Germany as of 2011, about 80% of the firms reported
to offer occupational pension plans including own contribution.2 However, the survey
question in the Linked Personnel Panel, which I analyze here, explicitly asks for pen-
sion claims from employer provided pension plans. Hence, I assume that a significant
contribution is made by the employer.
TNS Infratest Sozialforschung (2012) also reports numbers on the average monthly
contributions. In a survey of pension plan providers, the average contribution is e103
at the “Pensionskassen,” which provide rather traditional saving plans, and e101 at pen-
sion funds. These descriptive figures show that independent of the kind of pension plan,
a monthly contribution of about e100 is observed. This contribution can be interpreted
as a future pay-off on top the monthly wage.3 Descriptive regressions on wage satisfac-
tion presented in Additional file 1: Table S1 support the interpretation of occupational
pensions as a wage premium. Regression estimates show that even after controlling for
wages, bonus payments, and general job satisfaction, occupational pensions have a large
and significant correlation with wage satisfaction. What is more, this perceived wage pre-
mium is of similar size for employees facing the risk of forfeiture and those whose pension
claims are vested. Both groups attribute to pensions a similar impact on wage satisfaction.
Because of this significant correlation with wage satisfaction, I interpret pension claims
as a wage premium.
3 Efficiency wage theories
The standard efficiency wage theory by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) provides a simple the-
oretical framework and a clear theoretical prediction concerning occupational pensions
and work effort. However, I argue that the predictions are not different from Lazear’s
model of delayed compensations (Lazear 1979). Even though the core of these theories
provides explanations for non-classical wage setting, or even more generally, Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984) try to explain involuntary unemployment, the theories also provide implicit
predictions for the relation between pensions and work effort, suggesting a positive
relation if a risk of forfeiture is present.
3.1 The Shapiro-Stiglitz model
In their seminal paper “Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device,”
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) present an agency model which assumes incomplete informa-
tion about the employee’s true effort provision. The model further allows employees to
shirk. The core result of their model is the non-shirking condition (NSC), which implies
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that employers should pay wages exceeding the market wage. If shirking is detected by
the employer, the employee would lose this wage premium. Therefore, a wage premium
on top of the market wage reduces the employee’s incentives to shirk. The model requires
a positive probability of detection in the case of shirking and a punishment for detected
employees. The probability of detection is often referred to as the monitoring inten-
sity of the employer. However, to define the punishment, the market wage has to be
distinguished from the wage premium, which is not replaced on the market.
3.2 Occupational pensions as a wage premium
As discussed in section 2, occupational pensions are associated with an average monthly
contribution of about e100, which is paid on top of the monthly wage. This additional
wage component has a present value and is therefore interpreted as a wage premium.
However, the theory also requires that this premium is at risk if an employee shirks. The
non-forfeiture clause for employer provided pension suggests a clear distinction between
vested pension claims and employees facing the risk of forfeiture, within the first five
years of contributions. Within this five-year period, individuals face a severe punishment
in the case of job loss, and therefore the employer provided pension reduces incentives
for shirking. However, if the pension claims are vested, employees retain their claims. For
this latter group, the theory is uncertain about a direct effect of pensions on work effort.
3.3 Lazear’s theory of delayed compensation
Lazear’s theory of delayed compensation advises a compensation scheme which jointly
improves the interests of employers and employees (Lazear 1979). He suggests a payment
scheme which pays the employee less than the value of marginal product when young and
more than the value of marginal product when old. This is optimal for both parties since
it increases lifetime income as well as lifetime productivity. The back-loading of contracts
lowers incentives for shirking because it induces a punishment in the case of detection,
i.e., the employee would lose the higher future earnings prospects.
Even though Lazear (1979) used this theoretical framework to argue for a mandatory
retirement date,4 he also mentions pensions as an instrument to compensate workers
with delay. The theory predicts that pensions as an instrument for delayed compensations
lower incentives for shirking and hence should increase the average effort. However, it
requires that the delayed compensation would be lost in case shirking is detected. This
again is the case as long as the employer provided pension is not vested, i.e., within the
first five years of contributions.
3.4 Previous empirical tests
Previous empirical tests of these theories mostly exploit the relationship between wage
premiums (or pensions) and monitoring, concluding that a negative correlation “con-
firms” or “proves” the theory (se among others Hutchens (1987)).
Little evidence has been presented on direct effort-enhancing effects of pensions. On
the individual level, Luchak and Gellatly (2001) find a positive effect of occupational pen-
sions on continuance commitment but a negative effect on affective commitment. The
study neither presents a conclusive result nor the theoretical mechanism of the ana-
lyzed relationship. However, evidence using firm-level performance is not conclusive
either. While Allen and Clark (1987) find an effect on productivity but no effect on firm
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performance, Schnabel andWagner (2001) find the opposite, i.e., a positive effect on firm
performance but no effect on labor productivity.
In contrast to approaches used in the literature, I use the Utrecht Work Engagement
Scale and provide direct evidence on the relationship between occupational pensions and
work engagement.
4 Data
4.1 The linked personnel panel
The primary data source of this article is the German Linked Personnel Panel (LPP). The
LPP is a new linked employer-employee data set, in which the establishment-level and
the individual-level information is collected from surveys. The surveys of the LPP are
jointly developed by the Center for European Economic Research (ZEW), the University
of Cologne, and the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). The establishment-level
interviews are conducted in face-to-face interviews,5 and employees are surveyed in com-
puter assisted telephone interviews.6 A unique establishment identifier allows a perfect
link between establishments and employees. Together this procedure results in a linked
employer-employee data set, which is rich in employment specific information.7
On the employee side, the LPP comprises independent individual interviews on a ran-
dom sample of employees employed at an establishment participating in the employer
survey. The employee survey, which includes most of the variables for my analysis, com-
prises of employment and individual specific characteristics. Most important among
the employee specific information is whether the respective person has claims to an
employer provided occupational pension. The information about occupational pensions
also includes the year in which these occupational pension savings started. From this vari-
able, I construct a variable indicating the risk of forfeiture if pension savings stared within
the last five years.
Individual specific characteristics, which I use as control variables, include demo-
graphic characteristics such as education (4 categories), age (4 categories), and dummies
for gender, family status, and migration background. Further, the individual controls
include job specific information on blue/white collar status, temporary contracts, as well
as subjective assessments about the perceived job security (3 categories) and the individ-
ual conditions of work. Particularly important for the analysis is information about gross
wages and bonus payments since I am interpreting the employer provided occupational
pension as a premium on top of the regular remuneration.
Furthermore, a unique individual identifier allows a link with administrative individual
data from the IAB Employment Histories, which I use to obtain administrative infor-
mation on occupations (30 categories), job tenure (year dummies) and labor market
experience. The procedure proposed by Eberle et al. (2013) allows extracting experience
and tenure from the administrative spell data.8
4.2 Analysis sample
The 2012 cross section is the first wave of the LPP and the data source for the present
study.9 The full sample includes 860 establishment observations and 7,347 individual
observations10 employed at one of these workplaces. Of the individuals, 82% agreed to
link the data. Further, I lose some of the observations because of missing values in the
covariates, which finally results in a linked data set comprising 785 establishment-level
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observations and 5,024 employee observations (Table 1). Of the individuals, 2,629 have
claims from an occupational pension. Of these, 802 employees, representing 15.8% of the
sample, face the risk of forfeiture in the case of a job termination.
4.3 Work engagement
In the regression analysis, I investigate whether occupational pensions affect the employ-
ees’ work engagement. Work engagement is measured by the Utrecht Work Engagament
Scale (UWES). The UWES captures three dimensions of individual engagement: vigor,
dedication, and absorption (Schaufeli et al. 2006). Vigor is the individual’s willingness to
invest effort (even in the face of difficulties). A dedicated employee is strongly involved
in his work, i.e., experiences a sense of significance, enthusiasm, inspiration, and pride.
Absorption captures the employee’s level of work concentration. High absorption is
observed if time passes by quickly and if the employee has difficulties with detaching him-
self from work. The UWES comprises responses to nine different statements together
capturing these three dimensions of work engagement. I construct the engagement vari-
able as the average over these nine responses for each individual.11 Finally, the variable
is mean-standardized, which allows an interpretation of the estimated effects in standard
deviations of work engagement.
5 Pension claims across employers
In this section, I descriptively analyze whether establishment characteristics explain the
presence of occupational pension claims. The analysis has a rather descriptive nature but
provides important insights. It indicates whether pensions are selective across establish-
ments and points to whether establishment heterogeneity should be considered when
analyzing the primary research question: Do occupational pensions combined with a risk
of forfeiture affect work engagement?
Previous studies mostly analyze access to pension plans and try to identify firm char-
acteristics, which explain the employers’ provision of pensions. For Germany, these
studies find that profitability and turnover rates (Schnabel and Wagner 2001), as well
as firm size (Dummann 2008) are associated with offering an occupational pension.
Table 1 Linked analysis sample
Establishments Employees
No pension claims Occupational pension claims
Vested pension claims Risk of forfeiture
Total LPP sample:
N 860 3,536 2,683 1,128
in % 48,1% 36.5% 15.4%
Linked analysis sample:
(Employees without missing information who agreed to link their data)
N 785 2,395 1,827 802
in % 47,7% 36.4% 16.0%
Data source: LPP 2012 and IAB-Establishment Panel 2012, analysis sample.
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Furthermore, Dummann (2008) shows that firms inWestern Germany, as well as firms in
manufacturing and the financial sector, are more likely to provide pensions.
I try to replicate those findings in descriptive regressions of pension claims on employer
characteristics. The binary dependent variable indicates whether an employee has claims
to an employer provided pension:
pensioni = z′j ∗ β + ui (1)
β captures the coefficients of interest explaining which establishments provide pen-
sions. Establishment-level explanatory variables included in z are retrieved from the
IAB-Establishment Panel and include information about establishment size (4 categories),
profitability, the employer’s administrative laziness (calculated as the share of missings
in voluntary characteristics of the administrative employment reports), as well as infor-
mation on worker co-determination, i.e., the establishment’s participation in collective
bargaining and the existence of a works council. Since I regress an individual-level vari-
able on establishment characteristics, I allow for an establishment-level error correlation
in u. This also adjusts statistical inference to the true number of establishment-level
observations in the data.12
pensioni = z′j ∗ β + x′i ∗ δ + ui (2)
In an alternative specification presented by equation 2, I add individual control variables
to control for differences across respondents. The individual control variables in vector x
include job specific characteristics and individual characteristics such as those described
in section 4.
The results presented in Table 2 are partial effects from an OLS specification. The
first column presents the impact of establishment-level characteristics without control-
ling for individual differences, whereas Column 2 presents partial effects controlling for
individual differences. The effects show that worker co-determination is important for
occupational pensions. Both works councils and participation in collective bargaining
have positive partial effects on pension claims. However, the coefficient indicating col-
lective bargaining falls short of significance in the second specification. Together, this
finding is in line with Mitchell (1988), who shows that unionized workers are better
informed about pension offers. A positive effect of works councils is also intuitive since
works councils have to agree to changes in the pension plan provided by the employer
(BetrVG 2001).
In line with Lamla and Coppola (2013), I also include a variable capturing the employer’s
administrative laziness, which is measured by the share of missing information in vol-
untary administrative employment reports.13 The share of missing information in the
administrative reports is assumed to proxy the general administrative laziness. This
administrative laziness might be correlated with the provision of pensions, which is also
administratively demanding to employers. The results in Table 2 are in line with Lamla
and Coppola (2013) and show meaningful negative coefficients for this variable.
Table 2 finally shows a positive relation between pensions and establishment size. Scale
economies in pension plan provision can explain this positive relationship (Mitchell and
Andrews 1981). Overall, the results show that occupational pensions are selectively dis-
tributed across workplaces, and, hence, establishment heterogeneity should be addressed
when analyzing the effects of pensions on work engagement.
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Table 2 Establishment characteristics explaining the incidence of pension claims
Dep. var.: occupational pension claims
(1) (2)
Works council 0.079** 0.061*
(0.035) (0.032)
Collective bargaining 0.053* 0.039
(0.029) (0.025)






100-249 employees 0.034 0.008
(0.032) (0.029)
250-499 employees 0.070** 0.041
(0.036) (0.032)
more than 500 employees 0.103*** 0.073**
(0.036) (0.033)
Covariates:
Individual controls no yes
Establishment controls yes yes
Establishments 785 785
Employees 5,024 5,024
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (cluster=establishment). Asterisks indicate significance levels: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. The presented estimates are partial effects from weighted linear regressions. Dep. var: indicator that the
employee obtains claims for an occupational pension. Individual controls: occupation (30 categories), perceived job security
(3 categories), indiv. conditions of work, logarithmic gross wage, bonus payments, a white collar indicator, temporary
contracts, tenure (year-dummies), work experience, migration status, gender, age (4 categories), and education (4
categories). Establishment controls: industries (38 categories), profitability (4 categories) and legal form (6 categories).
Data source: LPP 2012 and IAB-Establishment Panel 2012, analysis sample.
6 The effects of occupational pensions on engagement
6.1 Baseline regression
In this section, I analyze whether pensions have a positive efficiency wage effect and
enhance work engagement. Mean-standardized engagement is the dependent variable
in a regression on a dummy variable indicating that the individual obtains claims to an
occupational pension.
engagementi = pensioni ∗ γ1 + x′i ∗ γ2 + i (3)
γ1 is the treatment effect measuring the effect of occupational pensions. The vector x
comprises a large set of employee-specific controls as described in the data section. Most
important among these controls is the information about wages and bonus payments, as
pensions are interpreted as a premium on top of monthly remuneration.
In order to test the the prediction that a positive effect of pensions is due to the risk of
forfeiture, I include the interaction variable risk of forfeiture to the empirical specification
(equation 4). The risk of forfeiture indicates a subset of pension claims and is hypothesized
to capture most of the effort enhancing effect of pensions.
engagementi = pensioni ∗ γ1 + risk of forfeiturei ∗ γ2 + x′i ∗ γ3 + i (4)
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To strengthen results of the risk of forfeiture, x includes flexible controls for the indi-
vidual’s job tenure using year dummies. For the risk of forfeiture, detailed controls for
tenure are of particular importance since tenure is likely to be correlated with the risk of
forfeiture, which is directly defined by the duration of occupational pensions savings—a
variable also indirectly pending on the duration working for the present employer.
The first two columns of Table 3 present the baseline regression results using the speci-
fications of equations 3 and 4. Conditional on all individual controls, the presented effects
capture the partial effect of an occupational pensions and the risk of forfeiture on the
mean-standardized work engagement. In column 1, the effect of a pension is positive but
small in size. Turning to the second column, the effect is entirely driven by the subset of
individuals facing the risk of forfeiture of their pension claims. For this group of employ-
ees, work engagement increases by 0.15 of a standard deviation. Moreover, there appears
to be no own effect of pensions without the risk of forfeiture.
6.2 Results controlling for establishment heterogeneity
I continue the analysis by addressing establishment heterogeneity, which might be rele-
vant for the results since pensions are selectivity distributed across establishments (see
section 5). If pensions are selective in the sense that engaged individuals tend work at
establishments in which pensions are prevalent, this could explain the positive effects.
To capture establishment heterogeneity in the regression analysis, I first include
establishment-level characteristics as control variables:
engagementi = pensioni ∗ γ1 + risk of forfeiturei ∗ γ2 + x′i ∗ γ3 + z′j ∗ γ4 + i (5)
Vector z, which is added in equation 5, includes observable establishment character-
istics. The variables include the establishment size (4 categories), as well as indicator
variables for works councils, participation in collective bargaining agreements, and
East Germany. Furthermore, z includes the share of missings in voluntary administra-
tive employment reports (defined as administrative laziness, see above), and categorial
controls for firm profitability and industries.
Table 3 Themean-standardized effect on work engagement
Dependent variable Engagement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pension 0.057* -0.002 0.063** 0.009 0.051 -0.002
(0.029) (0.032) (0.029) (0.033) (0.036) (0.039)
Risk of 0.155*** 0.146*** 0.144***
forfeiture (0.041) (0.041) (0.049)
Establ. controls no no yes yes no no
Establ. fixed effects no no no no yes yes
Establishments 785
Employees 5,024
Presented coefficients are partial effects from linear regressions. Clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses
(cluster=establishment). Asterisks indicate significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is the
mean-standardized work engagement, i.e. y∗i = (yi − y¯)/sd(y). Individual controls: occupation (30 categories), perceived job
security (3 categories), indiv. conditions of work, logarithmic gross wage, bonus payments, a white collar indicator,
temporary contracts, tenure (year-dummies), work experience, migration status, gender, age (4 categories), and education
(4 categories). Establishment controls: establishment size (4 categories), industries (38 categories), profitability (4 categories)
and legal form (6 categories), the establishment’s administrative laziness, as well as indicators for works councils,
participation in collective bargaining and East Germany.
Data source: LPP 2012 and IAB-Establishment Panel 2012, analysis sample.
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In a second step, I control for an establishment-level fixed effect (in the cross section),
which even more flexibly controls for establishment heterogeneity, i.e., for heterogeneity
that is unobserved. This provides the full within-establishment transformation, capturing
all differences across workplaces:
engagementi = pensioni ∗ γ1 + risk of forfeiturei ∗ γ2 + x′i ∗ γ3 + φj + i (6)
The results of occupational pensions and the risk of forfeiture on work engagement
controlling for establishment heterogeneity are presented in Columns 3 to 6 of Table 3.
Controlling for observable establishment characteristics (Columns 3 and 4), the effect on
engagement is still entirely driven by individuals facing the risk of forfeiture of pension
savings. It increases work engagement by 0.15 standard deviations. A similar effect size is
obtained in column 6, when including establishment-level fixed effects. After controlling
for potential selection across establishments, the risk of forfeiture still has a large effect on
work engagement. Suggesting that under the risk of forfeiture, pensions have an efficiency
wage effect on engagement.
7 Robustness checks
In this section, I examine the robustness of the baseline regression results by control-
ling for a large variety of personality traits and the perceived work environment. Both the
personality of individuals and the work environment may have meaningful impacts on
the outcome variable and may also be associated with participation in occupational pen-
sion savings. Therefore, including these variables provides a nice test of whether omitted
variables influence the results.
7.1 Personality traits
In a first step, I add personality traits as additional controls. Many recent studies
emphasize the importance of personality traits for treatment assignment (Caliendo and
Kritikos 2014). The data allow controlling for the big five personality traits and a self
reported measure for risk aversion. The big five might influence the results if they explain
the selection in occupational pension plans. For instance, if risk averse employees more
likely save in a pension plan to avoid uncertainties about future incomes, this would be an
important covariate explaining selection into treatment.
The results presented in Table 4 use the full specification including the interaction
with the risk of forfeiture and establishment-level fixed effects (equation 6). Most of the
big five personality traits seem to affect work engagement, but they do not affect the
results concerning pensions. In fact, the effect remains of similar size, which suggests
that the personality variables are not correlated with the incidence of pensions. This find-
ing also suggests that participation in an employer provided pension is rather a choice
of the respective employer than of the employee himself, which reduces the likelihood of
self-selection.
7.2 Work environment
In the second robustness check, I add controls for the individual’s perceived work envi-
ronment. The perception of the working environment is presumably highly relevant for
the individual’s work engagement and may capture the atmosphere at the workplace.
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Table 4 Regression analysis controlling for personality
Dependent variable Engagement
(1) (2) (3)
Pension 0.002 -0.008 -0.001
(0.036) (0.039) (0.036)
















Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (cluster=establishment). Asterisks indicate significance levels: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All specifications as specified in equation 6. For further notes, see Table 3.
Therefore, this second robustness check also evaluates whether the estimated effect is
co-determined by some other unobserved underlying effect at the workplace.
The data allow controlling for four different variables associated with the work
environment:
1. Clarity of goals describes how clear and present the goals of the employer are
perceived by the employee.
2. Supervisory support : The variable indicates how supportive an trustworthy an
employee evaluates the relationship to his supervisor.
3. Cooperativeness captures how cooperative an employee assesses the work
environment.
4. Fairness depicts the perceived fairness of rules and their execution at the respective
workplace.
Table 5 presents the partial effects of pensions, the risk of forfeiture, and the work envi-
ronment’s own effect on engagement using the specification of equation 6. The results
show that each of the subjective variables describing the work environment has a large and
significant impact on engagement. Some of these variables slightly reduce the effect of the
risk of forfeiture on engagement, but it remains statistically significant and economically
relevant in size. Concluding for this second robustness check, the efficiency wage effect of
pensions is robust against controls capturing the self-assessed work environment; there-
fore, it is unlikely that the estimates capture an effect of some other effect correlated with
the work environment.
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Table 5 Regression analysis controlling for the work environment
Dependent variable Engagement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pension -0.002 0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.002
(0.038) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) (0.036)
Risk of forfeiture 0.138*** 0.134*** 0.148*** 0.129*** 0.130***
(0.048) (0.046) (0.049) (0.046) (0.046)
Clarity of goals 0.238*** 0.090***
(0.019) (0.020)








Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (cluster=establishment). Asterisks indicate significance levels: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All specifications as specified in equation 6. For further notes, see Table 3.
8 Pensions and the distribution of engagement
So far, the estimates show that the risk of forfeiture has a positive impact on the aver-
age level of work engagement. However, the theories of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and
Lazear (1979) imply that pensions can reduce incentives for shirking. I assume that
shirking is represented by particularly low levels of work engagement and, hence, expect
a large effect at the lower end of the engagement distribution. To assess the effect size
across the engagement distribution, I conduct conditional quantile regressions.
To provide a brief description of the the mean-standardized density of engagement, I
first present a kernel density in panel A of Figure 2. Conditional quantile effects from
the specification without establishment heterogeneity, as specified in equation 4, are pre-
sented in panel B of Figure 2. The diamonds in panel B present point estimates of the
variable indicating pension coverage and the risk of forfeiture, as well as the respective
95%-confidence intervals for both variables’ coefficients.
Distribution of engagement Quantile regression estimatesb)a)
Figure 2 The distribution of work engagement and the effect on work engagement. (a) Distribution of
engagement. (b) Quantile regression estimates. Note: Conditional quantile regression estimates as specified in
equation 4. Estimates are presented in Additional file 2: Online Appendix A.
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The presented effect pattern across the distribution of engagement indicates that the
effect of the risk of forfeiture is mostly driven by an increase of the conditional distribu-
tion at the lowest deciles. However, from a statistical perspective, the estimates are not
different across deciles. Nevertheless, the observed pattern matches with the theoretical
prediction expecting a reduced incentive for shirking, i.e., a large positive effect in the
lower tail of the conditional distribution.
9 Conclusion
I analyze whether employer provided occupational pensions have an efficiency wage
effect by enhancing the employees’ work engagement. Efficiency wage theories suggest
that pensions affect work effort, but only in the presence of a credible threat that pension
claims are lost as shirking is detected. I exploit the non-forfeiture clause, which deter-
mines the conditions to which pension claims are lost in the case of a job termination.
Within the first five years of contributions to an occupational pension, employees face
the risk of forfeiture, but after this period, pension claims are vested. The theory predicts
reduced incentives for shirking if employees face the risk of forfeiture.
Applying this theoretical prediction to the LPP, I find a significant and positive effect
of occupational pensions on work engagement when the risk of forfeiture is present. The
risk of forfeiture increases work engagement by 0.15 of a standard deviation. However, the
results do not show a direct effect of pensions on engagement, i.e., when pensions claims
are vested.
In the first part of the analysis, I present descriptive regressions indicating that occu-
pational pension claims are distributed selectively across establishments. However, when
I control for workplace heterogeneity in the regression of work engagement on pen-
sions and the risk of forfeiture, the point estimates remain unchanged. Further robustness
checks, which control for the employee’s personality and the perceived work environ-
ment, all show similar effect sizes and confirm the efficiency wage effect of pensions in
the presence of the risk of forfeiture.
Finally, conditional quantile regressions indicate that the lower deciles are particularly
affected by the risk of forfeiture. This finding is in line with the efficiency wage theories,
which predict a reduced incentive for shirking.
If work engagement is a good proxy for productivity, this efficiency wage effect is
socially desirable and a valid argument in favor of vesting times for employer provided
pensions. This adds an argument to the discussion about vesting times. Previous studies
found a negative relationship between pensions and turnover rates because of the risk of
forfeiture (Rabe 2007). This negative effect on turnover might be desirable for employers,
but it also indicates labor market rigidity, which should rather be abolished. However, the
positive effect on work engagement should be in favor of employers and employees and,
therefore, provides a clear argument to preserve the regulation on vesting times.
Moreover, the risk of forfeiture solves the puzzle which I raised in the motivation of this
article: a rational employer provides pensions only if he receives something in return for
the costly contributions. A higher level of work engagement could potentially constitute
the gift in exchange for the employer’s contributions. However, this effect requires vesting
times for occupational pensions, which still exist, but have been deregulated in previous
decades.
Bossler IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2015) 4:8 Page 15 of 17
Endnotes
1Even though the private sector is not covered in the data, the same regulation holds
true. Employees only retain their pensions after expiry of the non-forfeiture clause.
2The “Entgeltumwandlungsanspruch,” which came into force in 2002, gave employees
the right to save part of their gross salary in an occupational pension plan. On demand
of an employee, employers are obligated to withhold a share of the gross wage in an
occupational pension plan. The deduction is made before tax such that employees save a
share of income tax, and both employers and employees save a share of the social
security contribution.
3Individuals usually receive a yearly transcript of their savings including a prediction
of monthly pensions after retirement.
4Individuals have an incentive to delay their retirement if they are paid more than their
marginal product. Hence, politics should set a timing for mandatory retirement.
5The establishment interviews are conducted by TNS Infratest Sozialforschung, which
is the largest German institute for social science and political science research data
collection. The survey is conducted jointly with the IAB-Establishment Panel, which is
the largest and most comprehensive annual establishment survey in Germany. This link
ensures high data quality. Establishments are drawn as a sub-sample of large plants
participating in the IAB-Establishment Panel with at least 50 employees. The LPP
includes probability weights, which allow adjusting for non-random sampling, making
the results representative for private sector establishments in Germany with at least 50
employees. All estimations are replicated using sampling weights and are presented in
Additional file 2: Online Appendix B.
6The employee survey is conducted by the Institute for Applied Social Sciences (infas).
7A comprehensive description of the LPP is provided by Bellmann et al. (2015).
8I also use administrative information on daily gross wages to impute missing wage
information in the survey responses. This ensures that results are not driven by survey
non-response in the wage variable. I observe survey non-response in wages for about
10% of the observations.
9Establishments were interviewed between July and September 2012, and employees
were independently interviewed between November 2012 and February 2013.
10This comprises all employee observations with valid information on occupational
pensions.
11The presented results are fully robust to an alternative summation of the nine work
engagement items using a principle component factor analysis. The estimation results for
this alternative outcome variable are presented in Additional file 2: Online Appendix C.
12Since individual observations are used in a regression with establishment
information, establishment clusters adjust for the sample size in the calculation of
standard errors.
13The variable is obtained from the administrative employment histories and captures
the share of employees for which no qualification is reported. Employers are asked but
not required to report a level of qualification for each employee. None of the results in
this paper pend on the inclusion of this variable.
Additional files
Additional file 1: Supplementary table.
Additional file 2: Online appendices. Online Appendix A— Quantile regression results. In this online appendix, I
present the numerical regression results included in figure 2. Online Appendix B —Weighted regression results. In
this online appendix, I replicate regressions using survey’s sampling weights. Online Appendix C— Alternative
engagement index. In this online appendix, I replicate regressions using an alternative dependent variable retrieved
from a factor analysis.
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